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In The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy,1 Carrie Menkel-
Meadow outlines the political-philosophical foundation for greater use of con-
sensus building in large-scale, public conflicts. She also suggests an enhanced
role for lawyers in these forms of deliberative democracy, both as representa-
tives of partisans and as neutral facilitators of the processes. In these brief
remarks, I will reiterate some of the points I found most helpful in her article
and explain their connection to an area of law I follow closely: marriage rights
for same-sex couples.
Same-sex marriage, a large-scale public controversy implicating funda-
mental values, demonstrates the truth of Professor Menkel-Meadow's claims
about the nature of conflict and our need for new processes to manage it. The
controversy about same-sex marriage suggests that Professor Menkel-
Meadow's blueprint for social problem-solving has real promise: the processes
she describes make room for complex, multi-dimensional descriptions of a
problem and then permit nuanced, integrative, or incremental plans for dealing
with it. Such an approach is critically needed with respect to same-sex mar-
riage, where partisans and popular media tend to polarize debate and hastily
demand that people choose a "side." 2 Public conversations, study circles, or
consensus building could allow for much deeper and more productive discus-
sion of such issues-before people identify as "pro" or "con."
But the marriage example also raises some cautionary points that give me
pause. It highlights another important aspect of Professor Menkel-Meadow's
argument: ideally, formal and informal, centralized and decentralized proces-
ses work in tandem to create sound public policy. Thus, even as I appreciate the
potential in new forms of deliberative democracy and share Professor Menkel-
Meadow's hope for the roles that lawyers might play in them, I would argue
that lawyers should continue to consider it their primary role to insure access to
* AB, Bryn Mawr College; JD, 1985, University of Illinois. Professor of Law and Director,
Center on Dispute Resolution, Quinnipiac University School of Law; Visitng Lecturer and
Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School. I credit Jane Saminare Docherty, Marcia Caton
Campbell, and Nancy Welsh for most of the information about consensus building
processes; they have generously permitted me to incorporate their ideas in this piece.
Richard Gora provided helpful research assistance.
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courts and legislatures as central destinations for most public disputes, particu-
larly those involving civil rights.3
I. MENKEL-MEADOW'S CLAIMS ABOUT CONFLICT
Several aspects of Professor Menkel-Meadow's description of conflict are
both accurate and profound. First, she observes that "modern day legal and
social problems.... may require input from a multiplicity of constituencies and
coordinated action by a multiplicity of legal and political institutions."4 For
this reason, she argues, "older conceptions and institutions of dualisms and
binary thinking ' 5 will be ineffective for resolving or managing these conflicts.
"Not all processes are dyadic," she says, "not all issues have only 'two sides,'
arguments can have many parts and any group of people can agree on some
issues (wholly or partially) and disagree about others."6 She thus suggests that
"democratic discourse theory needs to learn from dispute resolution theory, that
positions and parties may be multiple, that processes of deliberation may range
from principled argument to interest-based bargaining and coalitional behavior,
to appeals based on emotion, faith and belief, as well as fact."7 Therefore, she
concludes:
where modem social and legal problems no longer lend themselves to easy two-sided
contested positions for resolution either by votes in partisan legislatures or binary
judgments in courts of law, new forms of public (and private) decision-making may
be necessary not only to resolve social and political conflicts, but to find policy solu-
tions to problems of resource allocation, institution building and social and human
welfare.
8
II. "EXHIBIT A" FOR MENKEL-MEADOW'S CLAIMS ABOUT CONFLICT:
MARRIAGE RIGHTS FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
When I first encountered Professor Menkel-Meadow's article, I was help-
ing to plan a conference on same-sex marriage, jointly sponsored by the gay-
straight alliance at Quinnipiac University School of Law and our state bar asso-
ciation. Much of Professor Menkel-Meadow's article reflected my experience
with this highly controversial issue. For weeks, my frustration had been grow-
ing because the conference planning was (sometimes explicitly, always implic-
itly) based upon the assumption that we were facilitating a debate between the
two sides to the issue. We might take a multi-disciplinary approach, inviting
authorities to speak on psychology, history, law, sociology, or theology, but
with respect to each discipline there were assumed to be two sides. Presenters
were expected to marshal their points to speak for or against equal marriage
rights for same-sex couples.
3 See Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
4 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 348.
5 Id. at 348-49.
6 Id. at 358.
7 Id. at 359.
8 Id. at 352.
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The members of my planning committee who pushed this binary approach
were merely reflecting the way they had seen the issue framed generally: in
everything from court pleadings,9 to advocacy group web sites,' ° to Presiden-
tial announcements," the issue of same-sex marriage is often assumed to have
two sides-"pro" and "con"-and no more. Actually, this is not completely
true. In the past several years, a third position in the debate has emerged. This
third side is represented by people who promote civil union as an option, often
described as a "compromise,"12 and it has gained adherents in the wake of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health. Proponents of civil union are heterogeneous. Some feminist
scholars and "queer" theorists oppose marriage generally as a sexist institution
and promote civil union as an alternative form of legal recognition for same-sex
and different-sex couples alike. 3 Other proponents of civil union oppose equal
marriage rights for same-sex couples on religious grounds but want to treat gay
and lesbian couples fairly; they see civil union as a way toward greater equal-
ity. A third group opposes legal recognition of any sort for same sex couples,
but in the face of judicial opinions and shifting public opinion, they are willing
to support civil union or domestic partnership precisely because it creates a
second, non-marital status for same-sex couples (and thus in their view "pro-
9 Kerrigan v. Dep't of Pub. Health, CV-04-4001813-S (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 25,
2004); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, No. MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003).
10 Compare Robert H. Knight, Talking Points on Marriage, at http://www.nogaymarfiage.
com/talkingpoints.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (arguing that legitimizing civil unions or
domestic partnerships "does not expand the definition of marriage; it destroys it"); and http:/
/www.protectmarriagerally.com/purpose.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2004) (pitting the desires
and efforts of 3% of America (presumably LGBT Americans) against the 97% of Americans
who are nongay and therefore assumed to be against same-sex marriage); with GayCivilU-
nions.com, http://www.gay-civil-unions.com/HTML/opposition.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2005) (pro civil union website and providing links to "The Opposition" - anti Lesbian and
Gay Civil Rights).
11 George W. Bush, President's Radio Announcement (White House July 10, 2004)
(endorsing a Federal Marriage Amendment to "protect" the cultural, religious, and natural
roots of marriage from "a few activist judges and local officials" who have "taken it on
themselves to change the meaning of marriage"), at http://www.whitehouse.gov /news/
releases/2004/07/20040710.htm] (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
12 See John Fountain, Civil Unions Good Compromise, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 8, 2004,
at 2004 WL 59796234; Vermont Freedom to Marry, at http://www.vtfreetomarry.org/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2005) (characterizing Vermont's Civil Union Law as a "difficult compromise
for advocates of full and genuine equality for same-sex couples.")
"3 See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Structure Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,"
79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536-37 (1993) (part of the Symposium on Sexual Orientation and the
Law) (identifying marriage as an "inherently problematic institution that betrays the promise
of both lesbian and gay liberation and radical feminism," but arguing that marriage between
same-sex couples "would inherently transform the institution of marriage for all people.");
Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV.
765, 788 & n.146 (2002) (recognizing the progressiveness of Vermont's civil union for
same-sex couples, but also advancing the legitimacy of civil union as a liberating institution
for women in relationships with men).
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tects" marriage as a specifically heterosexual institution). 4 The diversity of
views within the civil union camp is often obscured in discussions and news
reports, however, and in the public view it can appear to be merely a compro-
mise between pro and con positions rather than an affirmative stance.1
5
One of the flaws in public discussion regarding civil marriage is that we
paint positions as monoliths, and deny the diversity of views that might exist
within groups of people who generally oppose or support same-sex marriage.
A second flaw in these public discussions-particularly from a dispute resolu-
tion perspective-is that we have done little, if anything, to develop and high-
light the common concerns and interests of people who find themselves on
opposites "sides" of the question. For example, the welfare of children is often
cited as a reason to prevent same-sex couples from marrying;16 it is also cited
as a reason to grant full marriage rights to such couples. 17 At least some por-
tion of this controversy is empirical. Social science yields a diversity of results
on this question (some finding deleterious effects for children raised by gay
couples, others finding no significant differences based on the gender of the
two parents raising the children). Partisans disagree about which of the studies
should be believed. 8 It seems possible that we could make progress in resolv-
ing at least this empirical question through social science. Influential people
14 Jennifer Peter, Massachusetts Lawmakers Reject Effort to Reach Compromise on Gay
Marriage, Associated Press, Feb. 11, 2004, at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachu-
setts/articles/2004/02/1 I/lobbying-heatsup-as-massprepares-to-take-up-gay-mamage-
ban/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2005); Massachusetts Constitutional Amendment to Re-define Mar-
riage Debate "Filibustered", LIFESTENEws.coM, Feb. 13, 2004, at http://www.lifesite.net/
ldn/2004/feb/04021305.html (characterizing a "civil-union amendment" as a compromise)
(last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
15 But see Susan Milligan, Senate Rejects Gay Marriage Amendment, TnE BOSTON GLOBE,
July 15, 2004, at Al (reporting positions of Senators John F. Kerry of Massachusetts and
John Edwards of North Carolina as "both hav[ing] said that they oppose gay marriage.")
16 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003) (recognizing
that "protecting the welfare of children is a paramount State policy," but holding that
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples does not further this policy); contra http://
www.heritage.org/research/features/issues2004/Same-Sex-Marriage.cfm ("Research indi-
cates that the intact family - a married man and woman who conceive and raise their chil-
dren together - best ensures the welfare of children and society.") (last visited Jan. 30,
2005).
17 Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Why Marriage Matters, at http://
www.glad.org/rights/OPl-whymarriagematters.shtml ("Married couples can take for
granted rights of hospital visitation, security for their children, and rights of inheritance. This
security has long been unavailable to same-sex couples.") (last visited Jan. 30, 2005). See
also Charlotte J. Patterson, Lesbian and Gay Parenting, APA PUBLIC INTEREST DIRECTOR-
ATE (1995) (concluding that "there is no evidence to suggest that lesbians and gay men are
unfit to be parents or that psychosocial development among children of gay men or lesbians
is compromised in any respect relative to that among offspring of heterosexual parents"),
http://www.apa.org/pi/parent.html.
18 Increasingly, some opponents of equal marriage rights seem to base their position less on
empirical results and more on theory, arguing from Natural Law that children fare better
with a mother and a father than they do with two parents who are of the same sex because
this is nature's plan. See Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Augustinian Goods of Marriage: The
Disappearing Cornerstone of the American Law of Marriage, 18 BYU J. PuB. L. 449
(2004); Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How Should the
Law Support Marriage?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 225, 232 (2004)
("Marriage arises in every known society out of the need to manage the biological reality
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who oppose same-sex marriage on this ground could negotiate with same-sex
marriage advocates to find mutually acceptable, unbiased social scientists
(assuming such creatures exist) and then enlist those designated researchers to
study and compare outcomes for children raised by same-sex and different-sex
couples. This route is fraught with danger., given the small number of same-sex
couples raising children and the fact that a controlled experiment is not really
possible (researchers would have to adjust for the fact that the different-sex
couples enjoy the protections and benefits of marriage, while the same-sex
couples must raise their children without those protections and benefits). Meth-
odological flaws might doom the studies to rejection by the losing-side. Still,
the concept of the respected third party and the attempt to agree upon process
even when disputants cannot agree on substance is fundamental-right out of
Getting to Yes. 9 Pro-marriage groups such as the Institute for American Val-
ues place great weight not only on the welfare of children, but also on the value
of social scientific research evaluating families and their outcomes.2° Surely
this search for common ground among thoughtful opponents would not be
quixotic.
A second shared concern or interest is the health and durability of mar-
riage as an institution. Clearly, same-sex couples who seek the right to marry
see marriage as a good and honorable estate-otherwise the right to marry
would not mean so much.2' Many who oppose same-sex marriage also esteem
marriage highly, and are deeply concerned with the health and durability of the
institution in the United States. With this shared interest in mind, perhaps more
could be done with workshops on communication, financial decision-making,
and parenting skills, cosponsored by marriage and family organizations on both
sides of this debate (e.g., the Institute for American Values, Focus on the Fam-
ily, and Parents and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG)). Such relation-
ship-strengthening workshops could be open to both same-sex and different-sex
couples. The result would be pro-marriage and pro-family, and at the same
time it would reveal the common concerns of couples and families regardless of
gender.
Besides the obvious resistance to "consorting with the enemy" likely to
greet such proposals, we face a deeper problem. The problem is that these
common concerns and possible steps to explore or resolve them have not been
developed; we lack processes that would reveal our common ground and permit
us to brainstorm next steps together. Too often, the only people talking about
same-sex marriage are the ones who have already made up their minds about
the issue, and they only talk to people who agree with them. Little dialogue
occurs across ideological lines 2 or among people who feel competing loyalties
that sex between men and women produces children, the twin social realities that societies
need babies in order to survive, and babies need mothers and fathers.").
19 ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHouT GIVING IN
(2d ed. 1991).
20 http://www.americanvalues.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
21 Admittedly, one could coherently reject marriage as an outmoded or sexist institution, but
believe that same-sex couples should have the same rights as different-sex couples to enter
into marriage.
22 Again I overstate the facts. At some web sites, people with differing views and those
who are undecided can share their opinions about same-sex marriage. See http://www.belief
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(e.g., a father who loves his gay son but attends a church that condemns homo-
sexuality as sick or sinful). In pursuit of more open and constructive conversa-
tions, I turn in the next section to discuss the potential for collaborative
processes in the area of marriage rights.
Ill. THE POTENTIAL FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY WITH RESPECT TO
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE2 3
We need simple conversation between human beings that permits the air-
ing of experiences, fears, and hopes. This may be our most difficult, but most
direct, route past polarization and prejudice.
Numerous NGOs regularly hold workshops or facilitate processes
designed to tackle controversial or divisive issues on which progress must be
made for the public good. Public Conversations Project (PCP), for example,
assists groups in convening constructive dialogues about difficult issues among
people with fundamental differences in values and worldview. PCP helps par-
ticipants develop more productive ways of communicating and stating their
perspectives so they can be heard by others. PCP has begun to convene groups
to discuss same-sex marriage, and will be an important resource for communi-
ties interested in bridging the gap between people on different "sides" of this
issue. Equally important, PCP will allow people who fall into the vast middle
to participate in the discussion and share their multiple perspectives.2 4
Visioning processes convene groups of people to brainstorm and build
consensus on preferred futures for their community - "the set of conditions
they want to see realized over time." 5 These processes come in many forms,
several of which could prove useful in the context of same-sex marriage.
"Study circles" 26 allow groups of invited citizens to take part in highly par-
ticipatory, small-group discussions of the issues. Study Circles (the organiza-
tion) creates and disseminates dialogue materials at no cost to the users. They
have already convened specialized groups to discuss gay marriage and are
poised to expand these efforts.2 7
In "community-wide visioning," an entire community is invited to partici-
pate in facilitated meetings directed toward envisioning a desired future. This
could be used productively at the smaller community or neighborhood level,
building toward a broader consensus of communities in a region. "Search con-
net.com/story/136/story-13601-l.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2005); http://www.gayquestions.
com/resources/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 30, 2005); http://www.familyscholars.org/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2005).
23 For the ideas in this section, I am particularly indebted to Marcia Caton Campbell, Jane
Seminare Docherty, and Nancy Welsh, my coauthors on an earlier essay exploring the
potential for deliberative democracy. Much of the following text is lifted from that piece.
See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, et al., Negotiation as One Among Many Tools, 87 MARQ. L.
REv. 853 (2004).
24 See Same-Sex Marriage: Resources for Dialogue, at http://www.publicconversations.org/
pcp/index.asp?catid=68&page_id=257 (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
25 Christopher W. Moore & Peter Woodrow, Visioning, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK 558 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
26 Study circles can refer to a process, but it is also the name of an organization.
27 See http://www.studycircles.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
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ference" bring a group of stakeholders together for a concentrated period of
time (typically two to three days) to discuss an issue exhaustively, envision an
ideal future scenario, and develop action steps to realize that future. For exam-
ple, a neutral civic organization such as the YMCA or a Chamber of Commerce
could host a search conference for lawyers, legislators, clergy people, policy
makers, and gay rights groups to develop a process for attempting legal change.
Documenting the results of processes such as these also makes excellent fodder
for a civic journalism project, resulting in coverage of same-sex marriage that
is less polarizing than the norm.
Too much of our public conversation regarding marriage rights for same
sex couples assumes and then exacerbates the polarization of the issue into pro
and con. This not only heightens divisiveness in our communities, but also
makes the hope of any resolution of the conflict less likely. A crucial move in
this situation-one that not only works for peace but also builds a more demo-
cratic society-is to promote and enhance the capacity of our "radical
center"-those citizens who want a reasonable, fair, and just outcome to the
problem. Helping this radical center find a voice, develop leadership skills, and
craft clear statements that contrast with extreme rhetoric can be the key to
preventing the conflict over marriage rights from becoming intractable. Some-
times the radical center needs to organize itself rather than just work within
existing organizations. While partisans may control (and therefore polarize)
the terms of the debate, ordinary citizens should be able to control the terms of
the conversations that lead to social and legal change.
IV. THE NEED FOR ADJUDICATION AND LEGISLATION WITH RESPECT TO
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Sometimes legal change occurs through the processes of deliberative
democracy discussed here and in Professor Menkel-Meadow's article. At other
times, our government acts as a "norm entrepreneur," deciding to change the
law before consensus for that change can form in the populace. This has been
particularly common in the area of civil rights. Surely it was no accident that
the Goodridge decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court requiring
equal marriage rights for same sex couples became effective on May 18, 2004,
the day we celebrated the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Topeka Board of Edu-
cation. Like Brown before it, the Goodridge decision has been assailed in
some quarters as the product of "activist judges" imposing a new social agenda
on an unwilling populace. And yet, as we look back on Brown, we see leader-
ship in the Court's unequivocal message: "separate but equal" will not stand;
this nation will not invidiously discriminate; it will not subordinate a class of
people to second class citizenship. Usually, judicial or legislative change in the
law follows social change in attitudes; in some cases, however, the law must
lead.
The trick is knowing which case we are in. I suspect that the evolution of
gay rights in the United States will be a dynamic, interactive process: slow but
steady change in social attitudes will be punctuated by judicial and legislative
changes, and those governmental pronouncements will spur further discussion
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and social change. In this way, the people conduct a kind of dialogue with their
government.
Informal, decentralized social change is spurred when gay men, lesbians,
and bisexual people "come out" to family, friends, neighbors and coworkers.
Social change also occurs when non-gay "allies" - those people who know and
care for Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual and Transgender (LGBT) people, or who sim-
ply care about gay rights - also make their voices heard in schools, houses of
worship, and work places. But it is important to recognize that such gradual,
decentralized social change can occur only when LGBT people know that they
can depend upon some civil rights protections. Courageous LGBT people have
come out in unfriendly times and places; they have declared their identity even
when the law has not protected their right to do so. Many more are empowered
to come out when they know that the law will protect their jobs, homes, fami-
lies, and liberty afterward. In this way, legal change fosters social change.
And the sorts of conversations Professor Menkel-Meadow envisions in her arti-
cle become more feasible.
The strength of Professor Menkel-Meadow's vision for deliberative
democracy, then, is in its "two track" nature. In her view, "public discourse in
associational and deliberative settings creates, identifies and debates problems
while more formal institutions approve solutions to and resolve those
problems."2 8 Deliberative fora are not the end of the process; nor, for some
legal problems, are they the beginning. In the case of marriage rights for same-
sex couples, for example, the formal action of courts in Hawaii, Vermont, and
Massachusetts-followed by reactive legislation and referenda-has jump-
started the public conversation. Without the expert opinion of justices in
Hawaii, Vermont, and Massachusetts suggesting to us that our denial of mar-
riage rights to same-sex couples is fundamentally inconsistent with our com-
mitment to fairness and equality, many Americans would simply not recognize
the importance of this issue. Without these court cases, a historically closeted
and marginalized minority such as LGBT persons would lack the platform to
bring their concerns to the larger populace.
Without the lawyers-Mary Bonauto,29 Dan Foley,3" Beth Robinson,3 '
Evan Wolfson,3 2 and Bill Woods,33 to name just a few in this most recent
round of marriage litigation 3 4-the judicial experts might not have perceived
28 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 355.
29 Argued Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), in Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court.
30 Represented plaintiffs at trial and appellate levels in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993).
31 Represented plaintiffs in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), then lobbied legislature
following court decision.
32 Director of Lambda Legal's Marriage Project for many years, now heads
FreedomtoMarry.org; argued Hawaii case and has coordinated national strategy for marriage
litigation. See http://www.geocities.com/freedomtomarry/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
33 Bill Woods is credited with having "initiated the idea of a legal challenge to [Hawaii's]
marriage laws.., and sought the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Lamda Legal Defense and Education Fund." PETER LANG, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, LEGAL
MOBILIZATION, AND THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 49 (Peter Lang ed. 2002).
34 Earlier rounds were less successful but nonetheless laid a foundation for recent litigation.
McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589
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the validity of same-sex couples' claims to equality. The fundamental role of
lawyers, at least in the area of civil rights, remains focused on the formal insti-
tutions: the lawyers serve as gatekeepers, translators, and framers to enable
their clients to "name, blame, and claim."35 And when those claims are recog-
nized in a more public or formalized way, the real conversations can begin.
V. CONCLUSION: A TRILOGUE BETWEEN COURTS, LEGISLATURES, AND THE
PEOPLE THEY SERVE
It is for this reason that lawyers must continue to stress their role as advo-
cates and champions in civil rights litigation even as they take on more concili-
atory and problem solving roles in other fora. I agree with Professor Menkel-
Meadow that lawyers may be uniquely endowed with the combined expertise in
substance and procedure to facilitate the sorts of public conversations aimed at
addressing large scale public disputes, perhaps even in the arena of civil rights,
such as marriage rights for same-sex couples. The marriage example shows,
however, the importance of preserving the role of lawyers in such disputes as
advocates, for without their efforts the issues might never come to the attention
of the wider public. Once the lawyers have framed the controversy in legally
cognizable terms and courts have recognized the legitimacy of those claims, the
public may be better primed to discuss the issues that led to the lawsuit and the
consequences that might flow from the court's decision. The legislature can
serve as a sort of mediator between the public and the courts, facilitating some
discussion before the court has ruled and then working with the public to
decide how the court's ruling will be implemented. In Connecticut, for exam-
ple, seven couples recently filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the
state's marriage law limiting marriage to different-sex couples. 36 When the
Connecticut courts rule in this case, surely the public response will be influ-
enced by the fact that the Connecticut General Assembly has been working on
bills related to same-sex couples for the past four years. This fact alone may
distinguish the Connecticut case from earlier litigation in Hawaii, Vermont, or
Indiana, where the legislatures had paid little attention to same-sex couples
until forced to do so by the courts. Because the Connecticut legislature has
already considered the issue from almost every conceivable angle, read
thousands of pages, and heard hundreds of hours of public testimony, the public
dialogue about marriage rights for same-sex couples is already underway.
When the courts rule, their opinions may strike the public much less as a non
sequitur and more as a sensible exchange of views in a system of checks and
balances. And with the promise (or threat) of a judicial ruling now on the
horizon, the legislature might just decide to moot the case by extending mar-
riage rights to same-sex couples. Imagine the conversations we'd have then.
(Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193, 196 (8th Cir.
1971).
15 William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blam-
ing, Claiming .... 15 LAW. & Soc'v REV. 631 (1980 - 81).
36 Kerrigan v. Dep't of Pub. Health, CV-04-4001813-S (Conn. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 25,
2004).
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